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varying common shocks. Resource discovery appears to have improved local income
measured by nightlights which could be reducing the conﬂict likelihood. We observe
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1 Introduction
Armed conﬂict has been part of human history since time immemorial. Eighteenth cen-
tury political economist Thomas Malthus in his essay entitled An Essay on the Principle
of Population noted that faced with resource scarcity, armed conﬂict is a key strategy for
humans in their struggle for existence. Charles Darwin was also inspired by Malthus’s
work when he professed that conﬂict and competition over scarce resources are germane
to the evolutionary strategies of species in their quest for survival in the natural world.
Even though armed conﬂict is integral to the process of allocation of scarce resources,
the interrelationship between the two is not very well understood. Provocative theories
on the relative power of greed and grievances abound, the true causes of conﬂict in the
resource rich regions of Africa remains largely unknown.
Until recently, research on the interrelationship between natural resources and in-
trastate civil conﬂict stood on the periphery of the economics discipline.1 The past decade
however witnessed a surge in research on conﬂict. Indeed, a large body of macro cross-
country literature document positive relationship between natural resources and con-
ﬂict.2 The emphasis is on the role of economic motives as opposed to social motives in
triggering conﬂict. For example, access to an oil rig or a mine could provide lucrative
ﬁnancial opportunities to rebel leaders to build and sustain rebel organisations which
would encourage armed conﬂict. This could override atypical social motives such as in-
equality, political repression, and ethno-religious division.
Establishing causality has been the key motivation in this literature. Chilling ex-
amples of conﬂict in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan and other
resource rich regions of Africa often tempt scholars to argue that resources cause conﬂict.
Yet establishing causality has remained illusory largely due to the obvious limitations
associated with cross-country studies. Furthermore, lack of useful data for Africa also
limited the scope for adequately examining the causal link.
In this paper we aim to systematically explore the causal eﬀect of giant and major
oil and mineral discoveries on internal armed conﬂict onset and incidence in Africa at
the grid level corresponding to a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degree covering the period
1946 to 2008. Using geocoded data on resource (oil and mineral) discoveries and con-
ﬂict we are able to construct a quasi-natural experiment to establish causality. In other
words, we are able to test whether resource discovery as an exogenous news shock has
1Note that ‘conﬂict’ here implies ‘intrastate civil conﬂict’. We do not analyse the relationship between
natural resources and interstate wars. For a recent study on oil and interstate wars see Caselli et al. (2014).
2See Blattman and Miguel (2010) and Ross (2004, 2006, 2015) for a survey of this literature.
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any bearing over conﬂict onset and incidence at the local level in Africa.
The paper makes the following original contributions. First, the paper uses a novel
geocoded dataset of resource discovery at the grid level. In particular, the new dataset is
able to distinguish between 11 diﬀerent minerals and oil discoveries.3 To the best of our
knowledge, this is entirely new. Note that two existing cross-country studies Cotet and
Tsui (2013) and Lei and Michaels (2014) use national level oil discovery data only and
not minerals. Second, the paper uses grid level data on conﬂict in Africa and not many
other scholars study conﬂict at the grid level in Africa.
The popular discourse both within the academy and the press is that competition
over resource wealth in Africa is the root cause of armed conﬂicts. Several cross-national
studies support this view (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 1998, 2004; Humphreys, 2005; Ross,
2006).4 Yet this is not borne out in our grid level geocoded data. A quick snapshot of
the continental map of mining and conﬂict locations in ﬁgure 1 reveal very little corre-
lation between locations of resource discovery and armed conﬂict onset. In fact contrary
to the conventional wisdom of resource riches triggering conﬂict in Africa, we ﬁnd oil
and mineral discoveries signiﬁcantly reduce the likelihood of conﬂict onset up to ten
years post resource discovery in a simple pooled cross-section set up with a sample of
47 African countries drawn from the Peace Research Institute Oslo Grid (PRIO-GRID)
dataset over the period 1946 to 2008. The eﬀect remains negative but statistically in-
signiﬁcant or weakly signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations when we control for grid-speciﬁc
ﬁxed factors and time varying common shocks. We observe little or no heterogeneity in
the relationship across resource types (minerals or oil), size of discovery (giant or major),
pre and post end of the cold war, and quality of national political institutions measured
by Polity2 score. We also analyse the eﬀect of resource discovery on conﬂict incidence
using a panel of 47 countries covering the period 1989 to 2008. The smaller sample size
here is due to the sparse temporal distribution of conﬂict incidence data. Even though
the negative eﬀect of resource discovery on conﬂict incidence remains in a pooled cross-
section set up, the trajectory of the coeﬃcient appears to be somewhat diﬀerent once we
control for grid and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀect stays negative for the ﬁrst four years post
discovery and then it turns positive and peaks at eight years post discovery. This could be
due to a decline in the incidence of ongoing conﬂict up to four years post discovery news
shock. Beyond that point production starts in these newly discovered locations which
trigger an increase in the conﬂict incidence. The heterogeneous eﬀects of discovery and
3The minerals are gold, silver, platinum group elements (PGE), copper, nickel, zinc, lead, cobalt, molyb-
denum, tungsten, uranium oxide.
4Fearon (2005) and Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) however challenge this view.
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production appear to be consistent with the observation made by Humphreys (2005) us-
ing cross-country data that the prospect of future production aﬀects conﬂict onset and
incidence less than the actual past production. Our results are robust to the inclusion of
additional covariates, region ﬁxed eﬀects, country speciﬁc trends, and the use of the alter-
native Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program Geo-Referenced Event Dataset (UCDP GED).
The obvious question here is via what channel resource discovery aﬀects conﬂict.
Natural resource induced higher income at the local and national levels could improve
state counter-insurgency capacity and reduce individual incentives to ﬁght (Collier and
Hoeﬄer, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Alternatively, natural resource induced higher
state revenue could incentivize capture and trigger conﬂict (Besley and Persson, 2011).
Evidence appears to be favoring the former theory rather than the latter. We ﬁnd that
resource discovery (oil and minerals) improves luminosity at the grid level which in turn
reduces conﬂict onset and incidence.5
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the exogenous variation in the discovery dates
of giant and major mineral deposits and giant oil deposits. Our dataset codes a mineral
deposit as giant if it has the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue
for 20 years or more accounting for ﬂuctuations in commodity price. Similarly, major
mineral deposits are those which could generate an annual revenue stream of at least
USD 50 million but not as long life as a giant reserve. A giant oil or/and gas (including
condensate) ﬁeld is deﬁned as a ﬁeld that contains at least a total of 500 million barrels
of ultimate recoverable oil or gas equivalent. Even though it is possible to identify the
area where minerals or oil are likely to be found using geological data, it is not possible
to accurately predict the timing of giant and major discoveries. Therefore, the discovery
dates of giant and major reserves are exogenous. One might argue that politicians and
government could manipulate the announcement of the precise timing of discovery. Our
data is immune to such possibility as the discovery dates are independently veriﬁed and
documented using multiple sources.
Administrative boundary demarcation could be a potential source of endogeneity in
a study of this nature. For instance, administrative boundary demarcations in a country
could be determined by political, geographic and demographic characteristics of the area.
This could in turn be correlated with both local conﬂict dynamics and natural resource
extraction contaminating the coeﬃcient estimate. This is unlikely to be a concern here as
our unit of analysis is a grid cell. The grid level data by construction is independent of
political, geographic and demographic characteristics and therefore is exogenous to con-
5Note that Bazzi and Blattman (2014) also ﬁnd support in favor of the income theory of conﬂict using
cross-country data.
4
ﬂict and resource discovery. Nevertheless, we also check the eﬀect of resource discovery
on conﬂict at the region and country levels.
Another source of bias could be the fact that mines and oil rigs are often military
targets in a conﬂict giving rise to a positive association between the two variables without
any actual causal link. Again, this is unlikely to be a concern here as we are ﬁnding
negative or no association between resource discovery and conﬂict.
The literature on natural resources and conﬂict is large. Recent theoretical studies
argue that the likelihood of conﬂict is related to three key variables (Besley and Pers-
son, 2009, 2011). The prize for the winner in a conﬂict is increasing in natural resource
rent. Therefore resources increase the likelihood of conﬂict. Higher wages in contrast
increases the opportunity cost of ﬁghting and hence reduces the likelihood of conﬂict.
Weak institutions and lack of state capacity to raise revenue compromises inclusivity of
political institutions and hence increases the likelihood of conﬂict. In a nuanced gen-
eral equilibrium model, DalBo´ and DalBo´ (2011) show that resource boom in the form of
a favourable price or technology shock lower wages and reduce the opportunity cost of
conﬂict.
In spite of the apparent theoretical clarity, estimating the causal relationship be-
tween natural resources and conﬂict has been challenging. Several macro cross-national
studies Collier and Hoeﬄer (1998, 2004); Humphreys (2005) and Ross (2006) report ro-
bust positive relationship between resource dependence and conﬂict.6 However, Fearon
(2005) point out that these results cannot be interpreted as causal as they could be driven
by omitted variables and endogeneity. Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin (2003) identify
weak institutions as the main cause of conﬂict rather than natural resources.
Contemporary cross-national studies have used instrumental variables and exoge-
nous news shocks to address endogeneity concerns and identify the causal eﬀect. Miguel
et al. (2004) use rainfall shocks as an instrument for economic shocks and ﬁnd that
negative economic shocks trigger conﬂict. Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Lei and Michaels
(2014), both use giant oil discovery as an exogenous news shock to identify the eﬀect of
oil on conﬂict onset. The former reports no eﬀect while the latter reports positive eﬀect.
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) examine the eﬀect of resource wealth and ﬁnd that the
same in fact reduce the probability of conﬂict. The overall direction of the cross-country
evidence could be summed up as conﬂicting.
Conﬂict is often localised and cross-national studies by construction fail to capture
6Hegre and Sambanis (2006) and Sambanis (2004) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of resource dependence on conﬂict
onset is not robust. More recently, Bazzi and Blattman (2014) revisit the question and ﬁnd no robust
relationship between commodity price shocks and civil war.
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local eﬀects. Yet disaggregated local level studies of natural resources and conﬂict are
rare. Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Dube and Vargas (2013) study the eﬀects of a surge
in coca production and commodity price shocks on conﬂict respectively in Colombia.
Maystadt et al. (2013) study the Democratic Republic of the Congo and ﬁnd that mineral
concessions have no eﬀect on conﬂict at the lowest administrative unit, but signiﬁcant
eﬀect at the higher administrative units.
More recently, Berman et al. (2014) study Africa at the grid level corresponding to
a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degree and covering the period 1997 to 2010. Using data
from the Armed Conﬂict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)7, they ﬁnd evidence that
mineral price shifts trigger low-level as well as organized conﬂict incidents in Africa. In
contrast we are able to use a much larger sample of georeferenced data covering the pe-
riod 1946 to 2008. We are also able to exploit giant and major resource (oil and minerals)
discovery as exogenous news shock to identify the eﬀects of natural resources on conﬂict.
This is unmatched by any other studies in the literature.
Our paper is also related to the resource curse literature. Auty (2001), Gylfason
(2001) and Sachs and Warner (2001, 2005) note that resource rich countries on average
grow much slower than resource poor countries. Subsequent studies have argued that
natural resources may lower the economic performance because they strengthen power-
ful groups, weaken legal frameworks, and foster rent-seeking activities (Tornell and Lane,
1999; Besley, 2007). Others have argued whether natural resources are a curse or a bless-
ing depends on country-speciﬁc circumstances especially institutional quality (Mehlum
et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010, 2014; Bhattacharyya
and Collier, 2014), natural resource type (Isham et al., 2005) and ethnic fractionalisation
(Hodler, 2006).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the empiri-
cal strategy and data. Section 3 presents evidence on the eﬀects of resource discovery on
conﬂict and discusses the mechanism. It separately examines the eﬀect on conﬂict onset,
conﬂict incidence, and conﬂict intensity. It also reports on any potential heterogeneity in
the relationship across resource types (oil and minerals), pre- and post-cold war conclu-
sion, size of discovery (giant and major), and quality of political institutions. Section 4
deal with robustness and section 5 concludes.
7Note that the ACLED dataset has been criticized by (Eck, 2012) and others for its uneven quality which
can produce biased results.
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2 Empirical Strategy
We use a panel dataset covering 10,257 grids from 47 African countries observed over the
period 1946 to 2008.8 The grids are the main units of observation here and they are con-
structed in GIS. However, we also estimate the model at the regional and national levels.
We superimpose a grid of equally sized cells on the territory of interest. In other words,
we divide the whole continent of Africa into a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees lati-
tude and longitude, which approximately amounts to 55 x 55 kilometers at the equator.
The full spatial-temporal grid structure allows us to conduct a subnational analysis in
Africa and is been used by several recent studies.9 The grid is well matched with the
standardized PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen and Buhaug, 2012).
The advantage of grid level disaggregation as opposed to subnational administra-
tive boundaries is that the former contains apolitical entities and therefore exogenous to
armed civil conﬂicts. In contrast, the latter is endogenous by construction. In particular,
administrative boundary demarcations in a country are typically determined by political,
geographic and demographic characteristics of the area and therefore could inﬂuence lo-
cal conﬂict dynamics.
To estimate the local eﬀects of resource discovery on conﬂict, we use the following
model:
Ygit+j = αg + βt +γ1RDgit +γ2YD10git + git (1)
where Ygit+j is the outcome variable (conﬂict onset, conﬂict incidence, and conﬂict
intensity) in grid g, country i in year t, αg is a grid dummy variable accounting for grid
ﬁxed eﬀects, βt is a year dummy variable controlling for time varying common shocks,
RDgit is an indicator of resource discovery in grid g, country i in year t, and YD10git is
the number of years with resource discoveries in the last ten years (from t - 10 to t - 1).
We estimate this model for diﬀerent leads j, where in most cases j ∈ {2,4,6,8,10}.
In order to check robustness of the coeﬃcient estimate of interest, we include addi-
tional covariates in the extended version of this speciﬁcation. The additional covariates
include grid level characteristics (distance to the border in km, distance to national capi-
tal in km, travel time to nearest urban center in minutes, mountainous terrain as share of
grid area, forested terrain as share of grid area, average precipitation in grid-year in mm,
8Due to data limitations, most but not all speciﬁcations cover 47 countries and 10,257 grids. In most
speciﬁcations, the panel is unbalanced. Appendix A1 presents a list of countries included in the sample.
9See for example, Alesina et al. (2012); Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014) and Michalopoulos and Pa-
paioannou (2013).
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and mean temperature in grid-year in mm), ethnic level characteristics (ethnic size as a
proportion to total population, ethnic total population, and ethnic level GDP per capita),
and country speciﬁc trends.
Our main interest here is the eﬀect of a change in RDgit on Ygit+j . The point esti-
mate γ1 presents the eﬀect of resource discovery on conﬂict. If the popular perception
of African conﬂicts being natural resource driven is accurate then we would expect γ1 to
be positive and statistically signiﬁcant. In other words, resource (oil and minerals) dis-
covery should be triggering conﬂict in Africa. Any indication otherwise would serve as a
refutation of the conventional wisdom.
Our main dependent variable civil conﬂict onset is a dummy variable which takes
the value 1 for each grid-cell hosting the ﬁrst recorded battle location for each intrastate
armed conﬂict. Our armed conﬂict onset is a rare event with 84 instances of battles with
more than 25 fatalities and 2257 instances of battles with more than 1 fatality.
Note that civil conﬂict onset is our main measure of conﬂict. However, we also
estimate the eﬀect of resource discovery on conﬂict incidence and conﬂict intensity. Con-
ﬂict incidence is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 for grid years when there
is an intrastate armed conﬂict with more than 25 fatalities. Conﬂict intensity is mea-
sured by the number of conﬂict events with more than 1 fatality observed in a grid-year.
Even though widely used in some circles, both of these measures are criticized because of
the lack of uniformity in their deﬁnitions. Fearon (2011) and Ciccone (2011) argue that
both conﬂict incidence and conﬂict intensity are aggregate measures of conﬂict onset and
persistence. Conﬂict onset and continuation are disparate outcome variables potentially
driven by widely diﬀerent factors. Hence, there is very little logic in combining the two
and assuming that resource discovery would aﬀect them in the same way.
The conﬂict dataset is sourced from the Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program Geo Refer-
enced Event (UCDP GED) dataset and the PRIO-GRID conﬂict attribute table. The for-
mer is an event-based organized violence in Africa dataset developed by Sundberg and
Melander (2013). The latter is derived from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset de-
veloped by Tollefsen and Buhaug (2012). Both datasets specify that conﬂict events must
adhere to the general and established Uppsala Conﬂict Data Program (UCDP) deﬁnitions.
According to UCDP, an armed conﬂict is deﬁned as ‘a contested incompatibility between
a government and one or more opposition groups that result in at least 25 battle deaths
in a year’. In addition to recording 25 battle deaths in a year, UCDP GED also record con-
ﬂict events with at least 1 fatality in an events-based format. We construct our conﬂict
dummy variables based on at least 25 battled-related fatalities as well as 1 battled-related
fatality. The former acts as our main measure while the latter is used mainly as robust-
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ness test. Following some notable recent studies (Ciccone, 2011; Cotet and Tsui, 2013)
we use the terms ‘armed conﬂict’ and ‘civil conﬂict’ interchangeably.
An alternative data source is the ArmedConﬂict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED).
We choose not to use this data for the following reasons. First, the data starts in 1997
and therefore would truncate our sample size signiﬁcantly. Second, our dataset which is
based on UCDP GED is widely used and therefore facilitates comparability. In contrast
ACLED is not very widely used. Third, some studies doubt the quality of ACLED data
and suspect that it can bias results (Eck, 2012).
Our main independent variable of interest is the resource discovery variable. Re-
source discovery is a binary variable taking the value 1 for oil or mineral discovery in a
particular grid-year and 0 otherwise. As it may be apparent from the deﬁnition above, the
variable comprises of two components. First, it identiﬁes grid-years with the discovery of
a giant oilﬁeld. As we have mentioned earlier, a giant oil or/and gas (including conden-
sate) ﬁeld typically contains at least a total of 500 million barrels of ultimate recoverable
oil or gas equivalent. Second, it identiﬁes grid-years with the discovery of a giant or ma-
jor mine. A giant mineral deposit has the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion
of annual revenue for 20 years or more after accounting for ﬂuctuations in commodity
price. Whereas a major mineral deposit could generate annual revenue stream of at least
USD 50 million but not as long life as a giant reserve. As we have discussed earlier, it is
not possible to accurately predict the timing of a giant or major discovery. Political ma-
nipulation of the announcement of discovery dates is also unlikely in our dataset as the
discovery dates are independently veriﬁed and documented using multiple sources.
The giant oilﬁeld discovery dates are sourced from Horn (2004) who also reports
the geographic coordinates of these discoveries. Many recent notable studies of resource
curse use this data source (Cotet and Tsui, 2013; Lei and Michaels, 2014; Arezki et al.,
2015). Note that giant onshore oilﬁeld discoveries are extremely rare as our dataset re-
ports only 59 giant onshore oilﬁeld discoveries between 1955 and 2010 in Africa. The
discovery dates of giant and major mineral deposits are sourced from MinEx Consult-
ing which reports the geographic coordinates of 258 such events over the period 1950
to 2010. Note that we also present estimates of oil and mineral discoveries separately in
section 3.
What is the mechanism through which resource discovery aﬀects conﬂict? The lit-
erature oﬀers several explanations some of which we review in section 1. Our data allows
us to test the income eﬀect thesis which postulates that resource discovery and extrac-
tion increases income and therefore increases the opportunity cost of ﬁghting. Higher
income also improves state capacity to suppress insurgency and rebellion which reduces
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the likelihood of conﬂict. We test this by estimating the following models:
Lgit+j = αg + βt +θ1RDgit +θ2YD10git + ηgit (2)
Ygit+j = αg + βt +λ1RDgit +λ1Lgit +λ2YD10git + ξgit (3)
First, we estimate equation 2 to test the link between resource discovery and lo-
cal income measured by nightlights . If resource discovery improves local income then
we would expect the coeﬃcient to be positive and signiﬁcant. Second, in equation 3
we test the link between this improved income and our outcome variables (conﬂict on-
set, conﬂict incidence). If resource discovery aﬀects conﬂict exclusively via the discov-
ery induced improved income channel then we would expect to be signiﬁcant and to be
insigniﬁcant.
Note that we do not have measures of income for Africa at the grid level. We use
satellite data on nightlights density or luminosity density observed over the period 1992
to 2012 as our proxy for income. We calculate luminosity density by dividing the sum
of all nightlights pixel values within a grid by the grid area. We source the nightlights
data from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System
(DMSP-OLS). The satellite images of the earth are captured between 20:30 to 22:00 local
time, and the satellites circle the earth 14 times per day. The data we use here is the
cleaned luminosity after ﬁltering for cloud coverage, other ephemeral lights, and back-
ground noise. The measure comes on a scale from 0 to 63 (digital number) calculated
for every 30-second area (equivalent to 1 square kilometer), where a higher value imply
greater nightlights intensity.
The distribution of nightlights across grids is not normal. We have a signiﬁcant vol-
ume of observations that take on the value zero. To account for this, we followMichalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2013) and Hodler and Raschky (2014) and deﬁne the dependent
variable as the natural log of nightlights density plus 0.01. It is widely acknowledged
that such transformation ensures that all available observations are used and the prob-
lem of outliers minimized.
The other challenge with nightlights data is measurement error. In particular, issues
relating to the diﬀerence between true lights emanating into space and what is recorded
by a satellite (Henderson et al., 2012). There is also variation in recorded lights data
across satellites. Measurement error of this nature is unlikely to be a concern here as
it is orthogonal to our models in equations (2) and (3). Furthermore, any cross-satellite
variation in nightlights is already accounted for by the year dummy variable capturing
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time varying common shocks.10
Other variables used in the study are: polity 2, distance to the border, distance
to national capital, travel time to the nearest urban center, mountainous terrain, forest
cover, average precipitation, mean temperature, and ethnic level characteristics. Table
1 reports summary statistics on all variables used and Appendix A2 presents detailed
deﬁnition of variables.11 Figures 2 present the grid level boundary map of Africa.
3 Evidence
3.1 Past and Future Discoveries of Natural Resources
Natural resource discoveries in the recent past in a particular grid could raise the likeli-
hood of additional discoveries in the immediate future. However, table 2 reports evidence
to the contrary. Even though there is positive correlation between past and future discov-
eries in pooled OLS models (see columns 1, 3, and 5), the correlation reverses within a
grid after controlling for grid and year speciﬁc unobservable (see columns 2, 4, and 6). A
discovery in a grid in the recent past in fact reduces the likelihood of another discovery
within that grid. This is not surprising given that a grid is a much smaller area relative
to a region or country. Indeed, at the region and country levels we observe a positive
correlation between past and future discoveries.12 The country level result is consistent
with Lei and Michaels (2014).
3.2 Resource Discovery and Conﬂict: Onset, Incidence and Intensity
Natural resource discovery could increase the likelihood of the start of a conﬂict. Table
3 tests how resource discovery aﬀects conﬂict onset. Contrary to expectation, resource
discovery appears to reduce the probability of conﬂict onset by 0.01 percent when we
estimate the model using pooled OLS. The negative eﬀect appears to be stable across re-
source type (see panels B and C) and statistically signiﬁcant. It is also persistent over
time as it survives 10 years post discovery. We ﬁnd no evidence of resource discovery
triggering conﬂict within a grid. The eﬀect remains negative but weakly signiﬁcant after
10Note that there is time series variation in satellite data here as diﬀerent satellites cover diﬀerent years
but there is no cross-section variation as all grids in our sample at a particular point in time are covered by
the same satellite.
11We also check for stationarity of the variables used in the model using Levin-Lin-Chu and Harris-
Tzavalis variety of unit root tests. Both tests account for bias emanating from cross-sectional association.
We ﬁnd all variables to be stationary.
12The region and country level results are not reported here but are available upon request.
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controlling for grid and year ﬁxed eﬀects reported in the last ﬁve columns of the table.
The individual eﬀects of oil discovery and mineral discovery within a grid remain neg-
ative but statistically insigniﬁcant. Note that, ﬁgures 3 and 4 present non-parametric
and parametric estimated plots of the eﬀect of resource discovery on conﬂict onset. Even
though not always statistically signiﬁcant, both ﬁgures demonstrate a decline in the like-
lihood of conﬂict onset post discovery.
Factors triggering a conﬂict could be widely diﬀerent from factors motivating con-
tinuation of a conﬂict. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between conﬂict onset,
conﬂict incidence, and conﬂict intensity. Onset ﬂags the start of a conﬂict whereas inci-
dence and intensity are aggregate measures of both start and persistence. In tables 4 and
5 we focus on the eﬀect of discovery on incidence13 and intensity respectively. The last
ﬁve columns in both tables exploit within grid variation using ﬁxed eﬀects estimation. In
table 4, we ﬁnd a decline in conﬂict incidence up to 4 years post discovery and the same
increases 6 years post discovery. This could be driven by not new conﬂicts but prolon-
gation of existing conﬂicts which converges with the start of production in many of the
newly discovered deposits. Note that it takes approximately 5 or 6 years post discovery
for production to start in these sites. Not surprisingly, similar patterns are observed in
the last ﬁve columns of table 5 as conﬂict intensity like conﬂict incidence is an aggregate
measure of conﬂict onset and persistence. However, the post t - 6 positive coeﬃcient
estimates here remain either insigniﬁcant or weakly signiﬁcant.
3.3 Resource Discovery, Nightlights and Conﬂict: Testing the Income
Eﬀect Mechanism
Theory predicts that natural resources could aﬀect conﬂict through multiple channels. It
is however diﬃcult to establish these causal channels empirically (Ross, 2004). It is even
more diﬃcult for Africa due to lack of data. Using our novel dataset, we are at least able
to test the income eﬀect mechanism. Resource discovery could impact on the local living
standards and inﬂuence the opportunity cost of conﬂict.
We do not have grid level income data for Africa. Therefore, we use natural loga-
rithm of nightlights density (i.e. dividing the sum of all nightlights pixel values by the
grid area) as a proxy measure of local living standards. This however restricts our sample
to 1992 to 2012. In table 6, we ﬁnd that resource discovery improves nightlights density
13The conﬂict incidence measure in table 4 is based on intrastate conﬂict. Note that some intrastate
conﬂicts end up being internationalised over time. Therefore there is a case for taking that into account in
the deﬁnition of the conﬂict incidence variable. We do that by deﬁning conﬂict incidence for internal and
internationalised conﬂicts and our results are robust to this alternative way of deﬁning incidence.
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in a grid by 0.7 percent after controlling for past discoveries, grid ﬁxed eﬀects, and tem-
poral common shocks. This result is consistent with the ﬁndings of (Mamo et al., 2015).
The eﬀect is marginally bigger for oil discovery than minerals.
In table 7 we explore whether the resource discovery driven improved living stan-
dards have any impact on conﬂict onset and conﬂict incidence. In columns 5 and 7 we
ﬁnd that indeed higher local living standards measured by nightlights reduce conﬂict in-
cidence and onset after controlling for grid and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In columns 6 and 8 we
test whether the eﬀect of resource discovery works exclusively through improvements in
local living standards. The coeﬃcient on resource discovery is negative and signiﬁcant
which suggests that there is a direct eﬀect of discovery on conﬂict over and above the in-
direct eﬀect via the income channel. The direct eﬀect could be reﬂective of the changes in
expectations. The local population could expect higher future income after a discovery
and this could reduce conﬂict. Our evidence is qualitatively consistent with Bazzi and
Blattman (2014) who ﬁnd support for the income eﬀect using cross-country data.
3.4 Size of Natural Resource Discovery and Conﬂict
Our dataset allows us to distinguish between giant and major discovery. The giant dis-
coveries are obviously far more superior to the major discoveries. All the onshore oil
discoveries in our dataset are giant whereas the mineral discoveries could be classiﬁed
into giant and major. The negative eﬀect of a discovery on onset remains unchanged in
table 8 irrespective of the size of discovery. Panel A reports the eﬀect of a giant discovery
on onset. We ﬁnd no evidence of a giant discovery triggering conﬂict after controlling
for past discoveries and year and grid ﬁxed eﬀects. This result remains qualitatively un-
changed when we distinguish between giant and major mineral discovery in panels B and
C.
In table 9, we test whether the size of discovery aﬀects the trajectory of a conﬂict
by focusing on conﬂict incidence. The pattern is similar to what we observed in table 4.
The sign of the estimated coeﬃcients stay negative for at least 4 to 6 years post resource
discovery. Beyond that point it turns positive. The negative coeﬃcient for the ﬁrst 4 to 6
years is perhaps reﬂective of the decline in conﬂict onset (or new conﬂict) post discovery.
Typically 4 to 6 years post discovery, production starts. A rise in resource production
often brings about an increase in the intensity of ﬁghting around existing conﬂicts which
perhaps explains the positive coeﬃcients post t - 6.
13
3.5 Resource Discovery and Conﬂict: The Eﬀect of the Cold War and
Institutions
The Cold War had a signiﬁcant impact on the African political landscape. The Angolan
civil war starting in 1975 had major outside involvement in the form of the Soviet Union
and Cuba backing the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) while the
United States and the CIA backing the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA). The deposition and subsequent execution of Congolese independence
leader and elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1961 also shares a similar Cold
War history which led to conﬂict. One could argue that the nature of the relationship
between resource discovery and conﬂict before and after the end of the cold war in 1989
with the fall of the Berlin Wall could be diﬀerent. In table 10 we test whether this is
indeed the case by dividing the sample between pre- and post- Cold War. The coeﬃcient
estimates remain negative and insigniﬁcant for the pre 1989 sample. For the post 1989
sample the coeﬃcient estimates turn positive but they still remain insigniﬁcant. There-
fore, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of resource discovery triggering conﬂict both before
and after the end of the Cold War.
Others have argued that institutional quality and especially the quality of political
institutions inﬂuence the relationship between natural resources and conﬂict (Arezki and
Gylfason, 2013). Democratic and inclusive political institutions could increase legitimacy
of the incumbent government and diﬀuse tension. Therefore, one would expect demo-
cratic institutions to reduce any potential negative consequences of natural resources on
conﬂict. We test this hypothesis using grid level data in table 11. We measure democracy
by the widely used Polity 2 score and we do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of institutions inﬂuencing
the relationship between resource discovery and conﬂict onset.
3.6 Resource Discovery and Conﬂict: Region and Country Level Ef-
fects
Resource discovery in one grid could trigger conﬂict elsewhere in the region or country.
As a result the negative sign of the coeﬃcient estimates within a grid may not be surpris-
ing as resource discovery only fuels conﬂict elsewhere. To test whether this is indeed the
case, in table 12 we estimate the model using region-year and country-year as units of
analysis. We aggregate all the variables at the region and country levels. Panel A reports
the region level results which comprises of 430 regions. At the region level we ﬁnd re-
source discovery signiﬁcantly reduce the likelihood of conﬂict onset by 0.3-0.4 percent
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after controlling for region and year ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀect on conﬂict incidence how-
ever is not signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst 6 years post discovery but turns positive and signiﬁcant
at . This conﬁrms the eﬀect of production on existing conﬂicts rather than new conﬂicts
as noted in section 3.2 and 3.4.
Panel B estimates the relationship at the country level with 47 countries and 846 ob-
servations in the sample. This result is comparable to recent cross-country studies on this
issue by Cotet and Tsui (2013) and Lei and Michaels (2014). Unlike these studies which
solely focus on the eﬀect of oil discovery, our dataset permits us to consider not only oil
but also mineral discovery. We ﬁnd that oil and mineral discovery has no discernable
eﬀect on conﬂict onset and incidence at the national level after controlling for country
and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Estimating the models separately for oil and mineral discoveries
do not change our results. The country level results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of (Cotet and
Tsui, 2013).
4 Robustness
The empirical relationship between resource discovery and conﬂict could be driven by
omitted country speciﬁc time varying factors which may not be readily observable. Dif-
ferent countries may have diﬀerent trajectory in terms of political and economic devel-
opment which could have diﬀerential impact on conﬂict. To account for such factors in
panel A of table 13 we include country speciﬁc trend as an additional control variable.
The negative eﬀect of resource discovery on conﬂict onset survives and in fact becomes
signiﬁcant. We perform similar tests using conﬂict incidence and conﬂict intensity as
dependent variables and we observe no qualitative change in the empirical relationship.
This conﬁrms that the empirical relationship is not driven by country speciﬁc time vary-
ing unobservables.
In panel B we control for additional grid level characteristics and ethnic level char-
acteristics which could be driving the empirical relationship. The grid level character-
istics are: distance to the border in km, distance to national capital in km, travel time
to nearest urban center in minutes, mountainous terrain as share of grid area, forested
terrain as share of grid area, average precipitation in grid-year in mm, and mean temper-
ature in grid-year in mm. The ethnic level characteristics are: ethnic size as a proportion
of total population, ethnic total population, and ethnic level GDP per capita. Again we
ﬁnd no evidence of natural resources triggering conﬂict in Africa. Note that precipitation
and temperature accounts for the role of climate in triggering conﬂict as emphasized by
some recent studies (Miguel et al., 2004; Hsiang and Miguel, 2013).
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Our onset and incidence variables are constructed using 25 annual fatalities as the
threshold. Even though this is widely used, some argue in favor of using a lower threshold
of 1 annual fatality. We test the robustness of our results using alternative measures of
onset and incidence using the threshold of 1 annual fatality. Our results are qualitatively
unchanged. Since both our key dependent and independent variables are binary in nature
the relationship between them could be nonlinear. To address such possibility we also
estimate a logistic model. The assumption here is that a logistic model would be a better
ﬁt than a linear model in the presence of binary dependent and independent variables.
However, a linear model is much easier to interpret than a nonlinear model. Our results
remain qualitatively unchanged if we estimate a logistic model. For the sake of brevity,
these results are not reported here but are available upon request.
5 Conclusions
Africa is often viewed as the prime location for natural resource driven conﬂict. The vol-
ume of research on this topic is sizeable. Yet establishing causality has always remained
a challenge. In this paper we are able to set up a natural experiment to study the eﬀect
of natural resources on conﬂict at the grid level covering the period 1986 to 2008. Note
that grids here correspond to a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees (approximately
55 x 55 kilometers at the equator). Using giant and major resource (oil and minerals)
discovery dates as an exogenous news shock we ﬁnd no evidence that natural resources
trigger conﬂict in Africa. In particular, resource discovery signiﬁcantly reduce the like-
lihood of conﬂict onset up to ten years post resource discovery in a pooled cross-section
model. The eﬀect becomes insigniﬁcant once we control for grid and year ﬁxed eﬀects.
This broad pattern in the data is apparent with both conﬂict incidence and conﬂict inten-
sity as dependent variables. However, on average a surge in the incidence and intensity
of ongoing conﬂict is observed 6 to 8 years post resource discovery. We also explore the
mechanism through which discovery could aﬀect conﬂict. Resource discovery appears
to inﬂuence conﬂict indirectly via improved local living standards and directly via im-
proved expectations of high future income. There is little or no heterogeneity in the rela-
tionship between resource discovery and conﬂict across resource type, size of discovery,
pre and post conclusion of cold war, and institutional quality.
A common argument is that the relationship between natural resources and conﬂict
is national rather than local. Hence using aggregation we also test the relationship at
the regional and national levels. Our main result that natural resources do not seem to
aﬀect conﬂict in Africa remains unaﬀected when we estimate the model at the regional
16
and national levels.
In spite of her colonial and post-colonial history as a supplier of rawmaterials, a vast
majority of African natural wealth remains untapped (Collier, 2010). These resources are
expected to be exploited over the coming two to three decades amid increasing global
demand for raw materials. The expected steady depletion of natural resources and the
favorable global commodity prices presents Africa with an opportunity to harness this
wealth for improving state capacity and living standards. Our research suggests that
both of these factors could signiﬁcantly contribute towards eradication of civil conﬂict
from the African continent.
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Appendices
A1. List of Countries in the Sample:
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Er-
itrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Su-
dan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
A2. Data Appendix:
Civil armed conﬂict onset: A dummy variable identifying the grid-cell hosting the ﬁrst
recorded battle location for each intrastate armed conﬂict with > 25 battle deaths. Source:
Sundberg and Melander (2013) and Tollefsen and Buhaug (2012).
Civil armed conﬂict incidence: A dummy variable equals one if at least one intrastate
armed conﬂict with > 25 battle deaths happened in the grid-year. Source: Sundberg and
Melander (2013) and Tollefsen and Buhaug (2012).
Civil armed conﬂict intensity: The number of intrastate armed conﬂict events with > 1
battle deaths observed in the grid-year. Source: Sundberg and Melander (2013) and
Tollefsen and Buhaug (2012).
Natural resource discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one dis-
covery of natural resources (giant or major oil/ mineral reserves) in a grid-year. Source:
Horn (2004) and MinEx Consulting.
Oilﬁeld discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of a
giant oil reserve in a grid-year. See section 2 for the deﬁnition of giant oil reserve. Source:
Horn (2004).
Mineral resource discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one dis-
covery of a giant or major mineral reserve in a grid-year. See section 2 for the deﬁnition
of giant and major mineral reserve and footnote 4 for a list of minerals included in the
dataset. Source: MinEx Consulting.
Democracy: Democracy score measured by Polity2. Source: Polity IV dataset (Marshall
et al., 2014).
Distance to the border: Distance (in kilometers) from the grid cell centroid to the border
of the nearest neighboring country, regardless of whether the nearest country is located
across international waters. Source: Tollefsen and Buhaug (2012).
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Distance to the national capital: Distance (in kilometers) from the grid cell centroid
to the national capital city in the corresponding country. Source: Tollefsen and Buhaug
(2012).
Travel time to the nearest urban center: Estimated cell-average travel time (in minutes)
by land transportation from the cell to the nearest major city with more than 50,000 in-
habitants. Travel time is time invariant. Source: Tollefsen and Buhaug (2012).
Mountainous terrain: Mountainous terrain as a share of total grid area. Mountainous
terrain is time invariant. Source: Tollefsen and Buhaug (2012).
Forrest cover: Forest cover as a share of total grid area. Source: Tollefsen and Buhaug
(2012).
Average precipitation: Average annual precipitation (in millimeters) in the grid cell.
Yearly observations covering the period 1946 - 2008. Source: Tollefsen and Buhaug
(2012).
Mean temperature: Average annual temperature (in degrees Celsius) in the grid cell.
Yearly observations covering the period 1946 - 2008. Source: Tollefsen and Buhaug
(2012).
Ethnic level characteristics: Contains information of the identity of spatially deﬁned,
politically relevant ethnic groups settled in the grid cell. The covariates include the eth-
nic size as a proportion to total population, ethnic total population and their exclusion
from executive state power. Source: PRIO-GRID GeoEPR attribute table (Tollefsen and
Buhaug, 2012).
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Figure 1: Grid Level Boundary Map of Africa
Notes: This boundary map is the grid level subnational division of Africa. The grid
has a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degrees latitude and longitude (i.e. around 55 x
55 kilometers at the equator), dividing the whole continent into equally sized cells. We
exclude small island countries (Saint Helena, Seychelles, Sao Tome and Principe, Re-
union, Mayotte, Mauritius, Cape Verde and Comoros) and Djibouti. Our sample consists
of 10257 grids from 47 African countries.
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Figure 2: Oilﬁeld and Mineral Discovery Locations and Armed Conﬂict Onset
Notes: The map shows grids with armed conﬂict onset over the period 1946 to 2010. The
grid-cell hosts the ﬁrst recorded battle location for each intrastate armed conﬂict (with
> 25 battle-related fatalities). The map also shows the location of mineral deposit and
oilﬁeld discoveries in Africa over the period 1946-2010.
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Figure 3: Resource Discovery and Civil Conﬂict Onset: Predicted Value of Conﬂict Onset
A: Both Oilﬁeld and Minerals B: Oilﬁeld
C: Minerals
Notes: The ﬁgure is plotted using a nonparametric local polynomial regression method
with an Epanechnikov kernel, and the bar displays a graph of the smoothed values with
95% conﬁdence intervals. The nonparametric regression is conditional on year and grid
ﬁxed eﬀects. We predict the value of civil conﬂict onset for a given discovery of natural
resource in a panel of grid?year observations. The sample period is 1946 - 2008 covering
10257 grids from 47 African countries.
26
Figure 4: Resource Discovery and Civil Conﬂict Onset: The Estimated Coeﬃcients
A: Both Oilﬁeld and Minerals B: Oilﬁeld
C: Minerals
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the estimated coeﬃcients from the regression of natural resource
discovery on civil conﬂict onset. On the horizontal axis we have the number of years
before or after the discovery, ranging from t-4 to t+10. The black lines show the estimated
coeﬃcients. All regressions include year and grid ﬁxed eﬀects. The sample period is 1946
- 2008 covering 10257 grids from 47 African countries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. First Year Last Year
Discovery of Oilﬁeld and Mineral Resources
Resource discovery indicator 646191 0.0004 0.021 1946 2010
Years with res. disc. (t-10 to t-1) 646191 0.004 0.067 1946 2010
Oilﬁeld discovery indicator 646191 0.0001 0.009 1946 2010
Years with oil disc. (t-10 to t-1) 646191 0.001 0.031 1946 2010
Mineral discovery indicator 646191 0.0003 0.019 1946 2010
Years withmin. disc. (t-10 to t-1) 646191 0.003 0.060 1946 2010
Civil Armed Conﬂict > 25 annual battle-related fatalities)
Conﬂict onset indicator 646191 0.0001 0.011 1946 2008
Internal conﬂict incidence 205140 0.161 0.368 1989 2008
Civil Armed Conﬂict (> 1 annual battle-related fatalities)
Conﬂict onset indicator 225698 0.01 0.1 1989 2010
Conﬂict incidence indicator 225698 0.02 0.15 1989 2010
Conﬂict intensity 225698 0.03 0.209 1989 2010
Democracy Variables
Polity2 640395 -3.336 3.476 1946 2008
Resource discovery * Polity2 640395 -0.0005 0.105 1946 2008
Oilﬁeld discovery * Polity2 640395 -0.0004 0.053 1946 2008
Mineral discovery * Polity2 640395 -0.0001 0.091 1946 2008
Additional Covariates: Grid Level Characteristics
Area of the grid cell (sq. km) 646191 7.921 0.436 1946 2008
Distance to the border (km) 632646 4.679 1.137 1946 2008
Distance to national capital (km) 646191 6.242 0.773 1946 2008
Travel time to urban centre (km) 646191 6.210 0.837 1946 2008
Mountainous terrain (% cover) 624771 0.111 0.194 1946 2008
Forest areas (% cover) 433377 2.881 1.478 1946 2008
Average precipitation (mm) 615814 5.976 1.050 1946 2008
Mean temperature (°C) 615814 3.197 0.167 1946 2008
Additional Covariates: Ethnic Level Characteristics
Ethnic size (share in total pop) 287550 2.908 0.971 1946 2008
Ethnic total population 282165 9.392 1.080 1946 2008
Exclusion from state power 284494 0.477 0.499 1946 2008
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for a panel of 10257 grids from 47 African
countries. See data appendix for variable descriptions and data sources.
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